Changing Worlds: Sexual Relations

    Sexuality is an uncomfortable topic where, in liberal states, the private and public domain diverge. Due to the sensitive nature of the topic, public and academic scrutiny is curtailed by self-censorship. Nevertheless, with moral, psychological, and biological overtones, discussion of the appropriateness of various relationships punctuates popular discourse. I need to provide a philosophical comment on what we consider appropriate sexual relations. I shall argue that what relationships are appropriate, ethically, must be guided by respect of individual rights, biology and historical anthropology. I start by looking back.

    In what follows, I presuppose that consent requires a certain level of maturity, which I do not spell out. It is also not my purpose to make specific suggestions about legislation, but rather, to challenge an uncritical psychology.

    In Medieval England, where life expectancy was around thirty-five, marriage was common at ages of fourteen or fifteen. Young girls would, in pre-modern societies, marry as soon as they were able to conceive, or shortly thereafter. In different countries, and states, further, the age of consent varies. It may be sixteen in some (and I think, fifteen, in Canada). The difference between various pieces of legislation demonstrates there is no consensus on an age of consent to sexual relationships.

    Incest, where there is a moral consensus on prohibition, is biologically disadvantageous (leading to higher incidents of birth defects). In considering the issue of the age of consent, we may be guided, at the outset, by biology. There is a developmental stage of puberty, where males and females may become sexually active. Before puberty, it is straightforward to prohibit sexual activity.

    A behavior may be abnormal in the statistical sense that it conflicts with social conventions. Also, there are behaviors that we consider abnormal in (almost) all societies, like incest (and is, further, biologically disadvantageous). In a liberal society, it in important that we not conflate claims to morality that confuse distasteful (a private matter) with wrong (a viable object of legislative prohibition). Wrongness must entail the violation of individual rights or, as I argue, find a basis in both biology and the anthropological record.